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Abstract 
Emerging powers like China, India and Brazil receive growing attention as objects in International 
Relations (IR) discourse. Scholars from these emerging powers are rarely present as subjects in 
mainstream IR discourse, however. This paper interrogates the conditions for scholars in emerging 
powers to speak back to the mainstream discipline. It argues, firstly, that ‘theory speak’ is rare from 
scholars based in periphery countries perceived to be ‘emerging powers’. Despite increasing efforts 
to create a ‘homegrown’ theoretical discourse in China, India and Brazil, few articles in mainstream 
journals present novel theoretical frameworks and particularly not framed as non-Western/Southern 
theory or even as a ‘Chinese school’ or ‘Brazilian concepts’. Secondly, scholars from emerging 
powers tend to speak as ‘native informants’ about their own country, not about general aspects of 
‘the international’. Thirdly, some scholars even speak as ‘quasi-officials’, that is, they speak for 
their country. 
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Emerging Powers in a Hegemonic Discipline  
 
Emerging powers like China, India and Brazil receive growing attention as objects in International 
Relations (IR) discourse.1 The proportion of IR articles with China in their topic in all IR journals in 
the Web of Science is now almost 8%, up from 4-5% in the 1990s and 2-3% in the 1980s. Articles 
on India and Brazil are still less than 2% but growing. Scholars from these emerging powers are 
rarely present as subjects in mainstream IR discourse, however. Only 512 of the 6914 articles with 
China in their topic have a Chinese author. Only 137 of the 1940 articles with India in their topic 
have an Indian author, and 149 of the 951 articles on Brazil have a Brazilian author. There has been 
growing resistance against this objectification in ‘emerging powers’ like China, India and Brazil. 
This has led some scholars in these countries to theorize from ‘non-Western’ or ‘Southern’ 
perspectives on IR, especially to recover ancient traditions, philosophies and historical practices. To 
speak back to Western IR on emerging powers rather than only be spoken for. The trend is notable 
in China where IR scholars debate how to construct a “Chinese School” of IR entered on the puzzle 
of the “Peaceful Rise of China” and building upon ancient Chinese culture, history and philosophy.2 
Indian IR scholars have also lamented India’s reliance on Western theoretical frameworks and 
called instead for constructing  “indigenous theories” now that India is emerging as a major power.3 
Some Brazilian scholars have promoted the development of “Brazilian concepts” to counter US 
theories.4 As this paper demonstrates, however, these theoretical and conceptual debates have gone 
largely unnoticed in mainstream IR discourse.  
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One reason is simply that IR as a discipline operates through a core-periphery logic: a 
division of labor where the main protagonists are scholars in the Anglo-American core that produce 
the advanced theoretical goods of IR which are then disseminated uni-directionally to scholars in a 
penetrated periphery. Periphery scholars do not speak back to the core, except perhaps in the sense 
of providing some raw empirical materials.5 However, few studies have actually studied the 
position of emerging powers in these import-export patterns of IR. Some country-specific studies 
have looked at the ‘import’ of Euro-American theories in emerging powers but little has been said 
about the ‘export’ of IR to the Anglo-American mainstream discipline. This paper interrogates 
whether scholars in the three ‘non-core’ emerging powers China, India and Brazil have been 
successful in entering Anglo-American mainstream theoretical journals, and, if so, how can they 
speak in mainstream IR? 
 
Chinese, Indian and Brazilian Scholarship in Mainstream IR Journals 
 
There are a number of methodological considerations when examining how emerging powers can 
speak in IR discourse. The purpose is not to map the ‘non-Western’ IR theory debates outlined 
above. This would require an engagement with scholarship produced outside the core of the 
discipline rather than that accepted by the mainstream discipline. My reading of Chinese, Indian 
and Brazilian scholarship published in mainstream Anglophone journals tells us more about the 
hegemonic structures of mainstream IR than it does about IR in China, India and Brazil per se. One 
reason is that so little scholarship from China, India and Brazil makes it into these journals.6 In all 
the 100,510 articles published in IR journals in Web of Science from 1990 to 2014 (October 20), 
China accounts only for 0.91% of all articles (915 articles), India for 0.29% (292 articles), and 
Brazil for 0.27% of all articles (271 articles). This ranks them 13th, 31st and 32nd, respectively, after 
the smaller IR communities of Belgium or Switzerland. The paper argues that these restraints make 
it all the more interesting to study what kinds of scholarship produced by scholars based outside the 
West does gets published in mainstream journals. This exercise illustrates what the mainstream 
discipline can accept as ‘being IR’ when coming from authors based in China, India and Brazil.  
Another important caveat is whether we should even expect Chinese, Indian and Brazilian 
scholarship in Western mainstream journals. It is important to emphasize that social structures and 
material incentives in the IR disciplines in China, India and Brazil do not necessarily favor 
participation in the mainstream ‘Western’ discipline compared to, say, national or regional journals 
or perhaps non-journal formats like monographs. There is an extensive and growing national 
journal market in China and most Chinese IR scholars prefer to publish in these journals although 
‘international’ publications are increasingly incentivized.7 An alternative strategy has also been to 
‘internationalize’ local journals by publishing them in English. The establishment of Chinese 
Journal of International Politics (CJIP) that focuses on China’s rise, Chinese ideas and theory can 
be interpreted as a way to spearhead Chinese IR into Anglophone IR discourse.8 The Brazilian 
publication space is arguably more limited and marked by discontinuity.9 National journals like 
Revista Brasileira de Politica Internacional, Contexto Internacional, Politica Externa and Cena 
Internacional are usually considered the main IR journals but elaborate bibliometric management 
schemes have been implemented to incentivize ‘international’ Web of Science publications. As a 
result the Revista Brasileira de Politica Internacional was recently listed in the Web of Science (as 
the only Brazilian IR journal) and also accepts publications in English. The growing orientation 
towards mainstream Anglophone IR is also evident in the establishment of Brazilian journals that 
publish (some) articles in English, e.g. Austral: The Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International 
Relations and Brazilian Journal of International Relations. India has long had a number of 
Anglophone IR journals—International Studies is the most prominent but also South Asian Survey, 
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Strategic Analysis and numerous area studies journals—that may have started as local, even in-
house, journals but later became outlets for quality articles by both Indian and foreign authors.10 
The relatively long history of English-language publications accessible by scholars abroad, Bajpai 
argued, should give easier access to Anglo-American discourse than in most other countries.11 
Nevertheless, there is a widespread disappointment that Indian IR has not entered “international” 
journals.12 Journals published abroad are seen as “difficult to penetrate” and thus Indian scholars 
tend to publish books.13 In sum, IR in China, India and Brazil may be primarily oriented towards 
national publications but there is a growing orientation towards ‘international’ journals. 
Third methodological question is how to delineate the IR ‘mainstream’. The paper examines 
whether and how Chinese, Indian and Brazilian scholars can speak in top Anglo-American journals 
as defined in the most recent TRIP (Teaching, Research and International Policy) survey conducted 
among IR scholars in 20 countries (excluding China and India, though).14 The top 20 journals 
identified in the survey are, in descending order, International Organization, International Studies 
Quarterly, International Security, Foreign Affairs, American Political Science Review, World 
Politics, European Journal of International Relations, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Foreign 
Policy, Review of International Studies, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, American 
Journal of Political Science, International Affairs, Security Studies, Review of International 
Political Economy, Journal of Peace Research, International Studies Review, International 
Relations, Comparative Politics and Global Governance. There is indeed an Anglo-American and 
mainstream bias to this particular list, but as I am interested here in studying what enters the Anglo-
American IR mainstream, this should make for a good indicator. I then use the Web of Science 
database to search for publications authored or co-authored by scholars based in China (mainland), 
India and Brazil in the period 1990 to 2014 (October 20).15  
This search results in 120 publications including research articles, book reviews and editorial 
material (43 Chinese, 22 Brazilian and 55 Indian). There has been a gradual increase in the absolute 
number of publications in recent years, especially from China. In relative terms, however, 
publications from authors based in mainland China accounted only for 1.1% of all articles in these 
20 journals in 2013, the best year so far, while India peaked with in 0.6% of publications 2009 and 
Brazil with 0.1% in 1998. In the recent five years, China has published fewer articles in these 20 
journals than smaller countries like Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Wales and Israel, while Brazil 
and India account for even fewer articles than countries like Finland, Spain, North Ireland and 
Singapore. Articles are published by relatively few cities and institutions in all three countries—the 
‘cores in the periphery’: Chinese articles are highly concentrated around Beijing (35 articles) and 
Shanghai (10), the two main centers for IR research in China. Similarly, Sao Paulo (10), Rio de 
Janeiro (7) and Brasilia (6), the three main Brazilian centers, produce most Brazilian articles 
(except one coming out of Florianopolis). In India, the major center for IR is New Delhi (28), which 
looms above the rest, but there are also numerous contributions from institutions in South India 
(notably Goa and Andhra Pradesh). Moreover, most articles are produced by scholars based at a few 
elite periphery institutions such as Fudan, Peking and Tsinghua in China, Jawaharlal Nehru 
University in India and University of São Paulo and Fundação Getulio Vargas in Brazil. Also worth 
noting is that international coauthorship links are also centered around these periphery hubs. 
Coauthored articles are usually written with authors based in the United States or Europe. Beijing is 
particularly integrated with its coauthorship connections to 25 different cities primarily in Europe 
and North America. In comparison, Delhi and Sao Paulo are linked to 3 cities, Brasilia to 2 and Rio 
de Janeiro to none. Coauthorship not only indicates integration into global IR, however. The fact 
that almost half of the Chinese articles (18) are coauthored with scholars from abroad suggests that 
it is more difficult for scholarship authored only by Chinese scholars to get published in these 
journals. Language capacities may play a role compared to India and Brazil where the proportion of 
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coauthored work is much lower. In sum, measured by relative presence in these top IR journals, 
‘emerging powers’ like China, India and Brazil cannot speak in the mainstream IR discourse. The 
few articles that do get published are worth examining more close, however. 
The following sections turn to the specific ways emerging powers speak in mainstream IR. In 
terms of content, it looks primarily at whether articles are theoretical/conceptual or empirical/case 
studies. If theoretical, what kind of theoretical framework do they present and are they positioning 
their theoretical argument in the mainstream IR discourse (e.g. the great debates, the isms, theories 
and methodologies) or as, say, ‘Chinese School theorizing’ or ‘Brazilian concepts’? If empirical, is 
the focus primarily on (international political) economy or security? Do empirical articles study 
cases from their own national or regional environment and function mainly as providers of local 
data or do they study any region of the world? Moreover, in terms of local expertise, do authors 
write as representative of their country’s view on a specific policy issue? Do they specifically 
address the Western literature on their country? (e.g. the ‘China threat’ and peaceful rise discourse). 
I outline three ways of speaking that emerging powers can speak in the IR mainstream: theory 
speak, native informant speak and quasi-official speak. Needless to say, these three ways of 
speaking are not mutually exclusive and some articles speak in more than one way. 
 
Theory Speak 
 
The first impression from reading these articles is that purely theoretical articles are quite rare. The 
presence of theoretical articles depends, of course, on the definition of ‘theory’. The aim here is to 
be as inclusive as possible and ‘theory speak’ thus includes all articles that frame their contribution 
as one of making a move in existing or emerging theoretical debates and literatures (this framing 
will often appear in introductions and conclusions) or articles that set up and apply an analytical 
framework as opposed to, say, simply start describing recent foreign policy events in their country. 
I also include critiques or tests of theory and even articles that make methodological contributions. 
A Chinese article on game theory and rational choice, specifically “how to cope with noise in 
the iterated prisoner’s dilemma” is an example of a purely theoretical and methodological article.16 
Similarly, an Indian article presents a mathematical model for interaction in domestic political 
hostility.17 These articles are probably the most universalist and rationalist of all articles examined 
here. Their mathematical approaches to theorizing bear no traces whatsoever of ‘local theorizing’ or 
empirical context for that matter. The same can be said about the theoretical work of Chinese 
scholar Tang Shiping, which accounts for 7 of the Chinese articles. Tang’s articles almost all seek 
to advance ‘theory’—mostly within a realist paradigm (offensive, defensive, neo- and 
neoclassical)—ranging from a social evolutionary model that incorporates and theorizes both 
material and ideational variables18 and the social evolution from offensive towards defensive 
realism19 through reviews, specifications and retheorizations of the “security dilemma”20 and its 
development into a dynamic and integrative theory of ethnic conflict21 as well as individual articles 
on neoclassical realism,22 reconciliation,23 and reputation.24 The theories advanced are not prefixed 
as ‘Chinese theory’ or a ‘Chinese school’, as one might have expected given the Chinese theory 
debates mentioned above, but simply as ‘theory’. The articles build exclusively on American, and 
sometimes European, IR theorists such as Mearsheimer, Butterfield, Herz and Jervis on the security 
dilemma. These articles are never about China per se and in several articles the only mention of 
China is in the author affiliation. Instead, theories are advanced and applied to empirical cases such 
as “American military interventionism”.25 One Indian article speaks theory in a similar way. It 
shows how global norms can be constructed through deliberative processes using in the case of the 
World Commission of Dams. The empirical case study is not the main contributions, however, 
instead the article seeks to make a move in the constructivist literature on argumentative rationality, 
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norm cycles, epistemic communities and transnational advocacy networks. 26  These ways of 
speaking in mainstream IR make universal, or at least non-Chinese/Indian, moves in existing 
theoretical debates within realism or constructivism. Articles directly advancing the project of local 
theorizing—as in a ‘Chinese School’ or ‘Brazilian concepts’—are nonexistent. 
However, there are other ways to speak theory in mainstream journals that engage more with 
local culture and history, particularly in articles that engage constructivist strands of IR theorizing 
(from mainstream constructivism and the English School to postcolonialism). The best example is 
Partha Chatterjee’s short essay “Whose imagined community?” that presents a postcolonial critique 
of Benedict Anderson’s imagined community.27 It does so by showing its limits in understanding 
the history of Indian nationalism and instead presenting a different theorization of nationalism in 
postcolonial contexts. Another Indian article on “Nuclear Weapons and Indian Strategic Culture” 
speaks to the existing theoretical literature on strategic culture (largely realist with some 
constructivist/cultural elements) but does so using empirical insights from India.28 The argument is 
that India’s strategic culture mediates between structural pressures of the international system and 
domestic choices and thus explains its restrained, stable and minimal nuclear policy. In doing so, it 
rejects essentialist portrayals of Indian strategic culture such as George Tanham’s argument that 
India’s cyclical and mythical concept of time prevent any long-term planning in the Western sense 
(something a lot of Indian IR scholars do).29 Another article that frames its contribution as 
theoretical, but does so using local history and culture as empirical material, is that by Erik 
Ringmar, a Swede then based in China. The article proposes a performative approach to 
international systems based on micro-sociological theory and draws empirical lessons in part from 
the performance and rituals of the Sinocentric tributary system during the Qing Dynasty.30 By 
putting the performance of the Chinese international system into a comparative frame (with 
Tokugawa Japan and Westphalian Europe), it draws conclusions about the different conceptions of 
space, scripts, membership and performances in each system. Another Chinese article engages the 
English School on Chinese history, although it is more a review and critique of the Eurocentrism of 
the English School (as well as other “Western IR theoretical schools”) than an advancement of a 
new theoretical argument.31 The article is nonetheless worth noting because it engages Western 
theory in the debate over the “’rise’ of China” and “peaceful rise”, notably China’s evolving 
relationship to the international society as it rises 32.33  
A third variety of ‘theory speak’ takes the form of theory tests. Here an existing theory, 
usually developed in the US or Europe, is tested empirically, not on ‘local’ empirical material but 
general datasets. Theory is engaged but the contribution is framed as empirical/methodological 
rather than theoretical as such: articles contribute new data, variables, models, tests or statistical 
tools that may enrich or challenge existing theories. The few articles that speak to mainstream IR 
this way follow an almost identical structure that first introduces the problem, reviews existing 
theory, derives hypotheses from it, builds a statistical model, runs the regression, presents results, 
discusses them and concludes. These articles speak more to comparative politics/political science 
than IR literature. This type of ‘theory speak’ is particularly found among Brazilian articles. One 
example is Przeworski and Limongi’s study of modernization “theories and facts” that tests 
endogenous and exogenous theories of modernization (the relationship between economic growth 
and democracy).34 Another article tests how democratization and economic openness affects social 
spending in Latin America.35 Although it is empirically focused on Latin America, one of its claims 
to novelty is that is measures variables more accurately. Finally, a coauthored study of foreign aid 
writes into the rationalist-constructivist debate and confirms constructivist claims that humanitarian 
discourse drives humanitarian aid allocation. This, and competing, theories are operationalized into 
hypotheses that are tested statistically on a dataset in a positivist manner.36 If ‘theory testers’ look 
more like “social science socialized” than “Third World radicals” constructing alternative local 
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theories,37 it is probably because all articles are coauthored with Americans and the Brazil-based 
author in all cases holds an American doctorate.  
 
Native Informant Speak 
 
Most articles accepted by mainstream journals are empirical articles about China, India and Brazil. 
Qua their access to local literature and policymakers as well as the concrete experiences of living in 
those countries, the native informant speaks authoritatively on his/her own country. The role of the 
native informant “is to provide information, to act as a source and an object of knowledge.”38 While 
theory speak rarely provides room for difference, the native informant speaks difference, albeit 
experiential difference only. These Chinese, Indian and Brazilian intellectuals (elites) become 
“native informants for first-world intellectuals interested in the voice of the Other.”39 They inform 
the West/North about what life is like in the East/South. The native informant thus speaks only for 
the particular, never for the general/theoretical. As Aydinli and Mathews argue in the context of IR, 
“when the periphery is recognized, it is not to contribute to the larger theoretical discussion, but to 
add understanding of a particular country or region.”40 In accepting this role, the native informant is 
posited in a hierarchical relationship to the mainstream discipline and its theorizers. The role of 
“local informants” is to provide concrete—and different—experiences to the center’s 
generalizations and theorization.41 Native informants work as “servants” in the global “House of 
IR”, as Agathangelou and Ling put it, they are domesticated Others providing local data about 
concrete low politics to the masters who can then theorize about the general aspects of high 
politics.42 There is an asymmetry in the logic native informants, Walter Mignolo argues: “if you 
‘come’ from Latin America you have to ‘talk about’ Latin America; that in such a case you have to 
be a token of your culture. Such expectation will not arise if the author is ‘comes’ from Germany, 
France, England or the US. In such cases it is not assumed that you have to be talking about your 
cultural but can function as a theoretically minded person. As we know: the first world has 
knowledge, the third world has culture.”43  
A variety of ‘native informant speak’ presents current debates going on within their 
country/language to foreign audiences. One example is a special issue on IPE with “China’s 
characteristics” where Chinese scholars coauthor articles with North American and European 
scholars on how IPE has developed in China and survey scholarship on hegemony, global 
governance, globalization, money and finance and constructivism.44 The articles are not framed as 
theoretical contributions per se, but as contributions with native information on how IPE is done in 
China (one wonders why all articles need a coauthor based outside China). These articles are 
exceptional in that they do engage the Chinese debates on IPE/IR ‘with Chinese characteristics’. 
Some even expect “uniquely ‘Chinese’ approaches to this area of inquiry, approaches informed by 
China's position in the world and China's rich cultural and intellectual traditions [but find that] it has 
produced little new knowledge and theoretical innovation”.45 Other native informants present 
empirical analyses of China in international relations, the majority of which address the 
implications of the rise of China. Some directly engage the ’China threat’ discourse and seek to 
elaborate and discuss China’s policy of peaceful rise 46. Others engage the related debate over 
whether China is becoming socialized and integrated into the US-led liberal world order or seeks to 
advance an alternative ’China model’. Some examples here are an article on the ’Beijing 
Consensus’ versus ’Washington Consensus’ that presents Chinese debates over the ‘China model’, 
largely framed by the question of whether a rising China will impose an alternative model.47 
Another political economy article on the China ‘model’ vis-à-vis the Washington Consensus that 
focuses on China’s socialization into norms of international institutions (the IMF) is also framed by 
the question whether China “is seeking to integrate itself into the existing patterns of global 
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governance so that it can play the role of responsible stakeholder? Or does it aim at a different 
world order, where it leads the developing world in redressing the balance of power away from the 
developed West?”48 An article on Chinese Africa policy “from the perspective of Chinese scholars” 
also takes its point of departure in the “rising of China” and “Washington Consensus vs. Beijing 
Consensus” but instead proposes a “win-win” framework for cooperation among China, Africa and 
Western countries.49 A study of how other states accommodate to China’s rise in terms of resource 
politics is, of course, also introduced with the story of how China’s remarkable growth, 
transformation and energy thirst forces others states “to accommodate the ‘rise of China’ and the 
threats and opportunities that this overworked expression implies”.50 This article, coauthored by one 
Chinese, an Australian and South African, also aims to present “a Chinese perspective” on resource 
politics. Although this is not clear, one easily assumes that the contribution of the Chinese coauthor 
was to provide ‘the Chinese perspective’. Chinese articles are not only about China’s (Peaceful) 
Rise but this is often an implicit element and serves as the general framing in the introduction or 
conclusion. For example, a native informant speaking about European Studies in China concludes 
with a discussion about how “European models” and “Europe as an example of peaceful rise” might 
provide inspiration on how to alleviate worries about the “China threat” among China’s neighbors, 
how to achieve regional integration and learn to coexist peacefully with the US.51 Most articles thus 
speak into the ‘China threat’ versus ‘Peaceful Rise’ or ‘revisionist’ versus ‘status quo’ discourse.52  
Brazilian native informants exhibit a similar focus on the country’s emergence as a middle or 
great power and its membership in BRICS, IBSA and other emerging power groupings, especially 
after the mid-2000s. When Brazilian authors spoke as ‘native informants’ in mainstream journals 
before the 2000s, the focus was on Brazil’s economy, development and international political 
economy. For example, a descriptive study of the Brazilian economy before and after the fiscal 
crisis53 or a study of civil society responses to the implementation of international development 
bank programs to stabilize the Brazilian economy.54 The contributions here are framed as empirical 
(“the case of Brazil”) about how Brazil or the “South” respond to such programs from the center.55 
Other early IPE studies focus not only on Brazil but trace the general development from 
protectionist import substitution models towards trade liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s in the 
Americas56 or in the World Bank.57 Later articles start analyzing Brazil through the ‘emerging 
power’ prism. Some are part of BRICS forums or special issues that set the stage for an empirical 
contribution: this is the article on the ‘B in BRICS’. Here Brazil-based scholars contribute empirical 
and historical information on their own country in order to explain its foreign policy decisions and 
bilateral relationships.58 Another article presents an account of the formation of the BRICS 
grouping in the wake of post-financial crisis delegitimization of global governance (with most 
empirical examples from Brazil).59 There is an element of trying to explaining to a Western 
audience why Brazil and BRICS aspire for recognition and to argue that Brazil is a positive force 
for change in a conservative order, a mediator between the weak and the strong that deserves more 
influence because it is a peaceful country that has settled all its territorial disputes and does not 
“value military deterrence as a source of international and/or regional prestige.”60 These articles 
border the quasi-official speak outlined below. Except from the empirical material drawn from 
Brazil it is difficult to ascertain whether these articles have ‘Brazilian characteristics’. There is no 
engagement with a ‘Brazil threat’ theory parallel to that of Chinese articles, partly because there is 
no ‘Brazil threat’ theory but also because the focus is more on political economy than security. 
Consequently, Brazilian articles tend to invoke a North-South rather than an East-West 
geographical imaginary: as in South-South cooperation like IBSA and BRICS or the hegemony of 
North over South. This geographical imaginary is not only a product of Brazil’s geographical 
location in the Western and Southern hemisphere, but also because the IPE focus draws attention to 
dependency-inspired questions of how Southern underdevelopment is related to Northern 
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development. Another Brazilian characteristic is arguably the policy-oriented histories of Brazilian 
(or BRICS) foreign policy that move chronologically and descriptively through policy events.61 
Indian native informants also tend to gain access to mainstream IR not only because they 
provide useful local information for the center’s theorization but also because they speak to 
Western security concerns. One way of doing so is to survey how India is doing in global rise and 
fall of great powers. An article on “India in the twenty-first century” describes a country growing 
economically, and in self-confidence, and goes through achievements and challenges in domestic 
politics, economy and foreign policy.62 Fifteen years later, an article called “How India Stumbled” 
informs Foreign Affairs readers on domestic explanations why “shining” India was supplanted by 
stagnating economic growth, growing social inequality and political deadlock.63 There is no India 
threat theory, but several studies nonetheless contain an element of reassurance stressing that India 
is not only destined to emerge as a major economic and military power on par with China, but as a 
major democratic country: “the world’s largest democracy” that will emerge “flying its economics 
flag and not parading its military might and making proclamations of power.”64 Elsewhere, India is 
represented as a restrained “status quo” power despite provocations from “irredentist Pakistan” and 
its ally China.65 Other articles speak to more specific security concerns. For instance, a study of 
Indian strategic culture that explains India’s nuclear policy to the West a few of years after India 
officially went nuclear, much to the chagrin of the US.66 Some years later, the American/Western 
security agenda shifted towards terrorism and an article on “Terrorism in South Asia” published 
shortly after 9/11 explains how India as a “leading victim” of international terrorism “shares 
common interests with the West in the counterterror campaign” and therefore supports the 
American war on terror.67 The article not only speaks about South Asia but does so, in typical 
International Security format, with policy recommendations for the United States: The United 
States should “behave as the leader of the world” and the democratic “values the West stands for” 
but also realize that “the only defense against the sly, murderous terrorists is offense aimed at 
hounding, disrupting, and smashing their calls, network, and safe havens.”68 India is probably the 
emerging power with most empirical contributions that do not follow the logic of native informants. 
There are a number of Indian articles on climate change and environmental governance,69 one on 
ASEAN and the financial crisis70 and the effect of “celebrity diplomacy” on development.71 Some 
of these articles contain elements of seeing the world from a developing country or Global South 
perspective,72 but are not only ‘native informants’ reporting on their own country. 
 
Quasi-Official Speak 
 
A third way of speaking in Western IR discourse is quasi-official speak. This is related to the native 
informant but the difference is that quasi-officials not only contribute with ‘local data’, they also 
aim to represent their country’s view on the world. While native informants are accepted by 
mainstream journals because they provide empirical material of a certain truth-value about their 
country/region, the quasi-official is accepted because he (it is only men) speaks for the country and 
its leadership. In the case of emerging powers, quasi-official speak becomes interesting to 
mainstream IR because it tells the ‘West’ something about ‘how the Chinese view the world’. It is 
epiphenomenal and politicized discourse. Quasi-official speak is accepted largely because of the 
position from which it is spoken, not only what is spoken. It tends to come from scholars who are 
also advisors, diplomats, government officials or work in international organizations or NGOs.73  
Quasi-official speak is exemplified by Wang Jisi’s Foreign Affairs articles that not only try to 
represent the Chinese perspective (“Here is a Chinese view”), but also does so in the typical 
Realpolitik discourse of Foreign Affairs where states (usually referred to as capitals, Beijing and 
Washington) are the primary units trying to safeguard their “core interests” against external 
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“threats”74: “Washington will not regard Beijing as its main security threat” and “many Chinese still 
view the United States as a major threat”.75 While quasi-official speak tries to explain China’s 
foreign policy concepts and leadership intentions to the world, i.e. the US, it does so within the 
Western frame of “China’s rise” and “‘China threat’ theory”.76 As Wang argues in relation to 
debates about a China model, the Beijing Consensus and China Dream, “the Chinese leadership 
does not dream of turning China into a hegemon or a standard-bearer”, rather “it is in China’s 
interest to contribute to a peaceful international environment.”77 Foreign Affairs also published an 
interview with the Chinese ambassador to the US explicating Xi Jinping’s notion of a “new type of 
great-power relationship” based on “mutual respect and mutual benefit” rather than a “zero-sum 
game” and explaining why China is not “revisionist” power but seeks integration and follows the 
rules: “We stand for necessary reform of the international system, but we have no intention of 
overthrowing it or setting up an entirely new one.” and “We never provoked anything. We are still 
on the path of peaceful development”.78 Quasi-official articles represent ‘the Chinese view’ in 
reassuring plus-sum terms that posit China as peaceful and only “rightfully” aiming for 
international restoration and responsibility.79 
Similarly, an Indian article in Foreign Affairs tries to correct America’s “negative view” of 
India (its nuclear aspirations) as a “revisionist state destined to be at odds with the United States”.80 
It criticizes the “West” for having unstated assumptions that “leaders of developing countries are 
more irresponsible, volatile and cavalier with the lives of their people.” The argument is that 
America’s “faulty assumptions” leads to a “misreading” of India (‘why don’t you understand us’) 
and the article sets out to clarify “India’s view” and “the Indian perspective” on things. There is a 
tone of humiliated civilizational pride where India “as an ancient civilization subjected to prolonged 
British colonial rule” would obviously defend its independence with all possible means, nuclear 
included, but does not have the offensive ambitions of an “aspiring hegemon”.81 The article on 
terrorism mentioned above also contains quasi-official elements when it explains what “India’s 
main concern is” with the US-Pakistan relationship and how “India was disappointed” that the US 
did not target Pakistan in the war on terror.82 
A Brazilian scholar-diplomat also attempts to explain Brazil’s diplomacy and international 
identity authoritatively using terms such as “in Brazil’s view of the world”, the “Brazilian attitude” 
and “how Brazil sees it”.83 It represents an quasi-official view by characterizing Brazilian foreign 
policy as essentially peaceful, tolerant of differences, a diplomatic bridge-builder, multilaterally 
engaged, by defending why Brazil’s candidacy for a permanent seat in the Security Council is 
“natural” and its “credentials are indisputable” or by arguing that developed countries are the 
illiberal ones in terms of trade while Brazil is a “fair partner” with “legitimate interests to protect”.84 
Likewise, the contribution is that of a “Brazilian” perspective based on “experience” when a 
discussion of the World Bank’s “identity crisis” by a former Brazilian finance minister starts with 
the sentence: “in this article, the author, the Brazilian Finance Minister in the late 1980s uses his 
insights and experience to examine critically the identity crisis of the World Bank.”85 Although he 
mentions development theory, dependency theory, imperialist theories of underdevelopment and 
neoliberalism, the contribution is inevitably framed as a Brazilian view on the World Bank’s 
neoliberal reforms, not a theoretical or even scholarly contribution. 
 
Conclusion: How Can Emerging Powers Speak? 
 
In quantitative terms, emerging powers still cannot speak in mainstream IR. Like scholars in other 
non-core, non-Western, non-Northern settings, the majority of Chinese, Indian and Brazilian are 
‘subaltern’ in the sense of having no voice in mainstream IR. It is difficult to ascertain whether the 
problem is that ‘they’ are not talking or ‘we’ are not listening.86 This paper has shown that when 
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‘we’ are listening, however, the few articles that access the infrastructure of global/Western IR 
discourse tend to speak in one of three voices: first, as theorizers within established Western 
theoretical traditions such as realism, constructivism or English School. Second, as native 
informants presenting empirical material from their own country. Third, as quasi-officials 
representing a perspective from their country. Theory speak from ‘non-Western’ IR scholars does 
not deliver the radical difference usually expected from scholars based in a different context—there 
are no “third world radicals” or indigenous theorizers in mainstream journals—rather it often looks 
like “social science socialized” disciplined by a mainstream discipline.87 The majority, however, 
speak about or for their own country and region. In the past decade, they do so increasingly using 
the ‘emerging power’ prism. There is no doubt that the growing attention to emerging powers opens 
up the discursive space of IR for scholars located in these emerging powers to speak at all. 
However, native informants and quasi-officials not only speak about and for themselves, they often 
do so within a securitized discourse. Particularly Chinese articles frame their empirical 
contributions by the debate over the ‘China threat’ and ‘peaceful rise’. It seems that Chinese 
scholars must, at least peripherally, engage the ’China threat’ discourse to get published in a 
mainstream Anglo-American journal. But why would even articles on political economy be dressed 
up in security speak? Why does a Chinese scholar frame the study of, say, China in the IMF in 
terms of whether China is a threat or not, whether it will be peaceful or not? It is almost 
inconceivable that articles on Germany or the United States in the IMF would have a similar 
framing. It is somewhat paradoxical to read Chinese scholars debating whether their own country 
will be revisionist or status quo oriented, whether it will overturn the American-led liberal order or 
integrate into it—questions infused by American/Western security concerns and a status quo bias. 
This mode of ‘speaking back’ has its pitfalls because it is always more of a negation to American 
threat theories, a ‘non-China threat theory’, than an opening for alternative and innovative 
theorizing. Although there is no India threat theory, Indian scholars are not exempt from this logic 
when they try to correct negative American images of India and reassure that India will be a 
different, democratic great power nor are Brazilians who try to explain why Brazil and the BRICS 
seeks greater influence. This raises the question whether ‘non-Western’ emerging powers can speak 
in IR without always already speaking back to the ‘West’, its theories and security agendas? 
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